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Abstract: This study explores – through British documents – the case of the restoration 
of the building which housed the Church and the Anglican community in Bucharest in 
1950s. At the end of the Second World War, having understood that no free political 
activities would have been permitted by the new local government, London concluded 
that a cautious but concrete propaganda activity was the appropriate response to the 
new situation in the country. In this context, the Anglican Church of Bucharest was 
deemed as a valuable stronghold, prompting the British Foreign Office to support the 
refurbishment works of the building. The edifice allowed religious worship activities in 
a country where the state was committed to reduce the local society’s way of life to 
dictatorial standards. In other words, thanks to the Anglican Church, the Foreign 
Office thought that the Romanians would remember the existence of democratic values 
different from those advocated by the Communists. 
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East-West relations in the first half of the 1950s witnessed the peak of Cold 
War tension. Originated by the Soviet occupation of the East and Central part of 
Europe (which highlighted an aggressive posture towards the Continent by 
Moscow) and by fear of conservative and moderate circles of the Western society 
(in turn clearly antagonistic towards the USSR) the Cold War was fought in Europe 
with unconventional methods. Many of these methods have been scrutinized in 
depth, and new contributions examined continually East-West bilateral relations 
and contrasts. The analysis of events related with the preservation of the Anglican 
Church building in Bucharest during the first part of the 1950s offers the 
opportunity to examine the British strategy towards the Communist States of the 
Soviet bloc in a crucial period of the broader East-West relations, during the last 
part of the Stalinist régime and the first years of the detente. 
The seizure of power by the Communist Party in Romania is a well-known 
matter, as it is familiar the strategy adopted by Moscow in European States where 
Communist Parties did not enjoy large following1. Despite King Michael had tried 
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in 1944 to preserve his power with a reversal of alliance – which brought the 
country to fight alongside the Allies even before the arrival of the Red Army – the 
fate of Romania was decided. Avoiding initiatives that could have worried the 
international public opinion, the local Communist Party participated in a 
Government comprising Ministers coming from moderate parties. However, the 
Communists controlled key Ministries (Home Department, Justice and Public 
Works) in the newly formed coalition2. 
Not surprisingly, all these events were in turn analysed by Western Europe, 
British public opinion and Foreign Office. From November 1945 onwards many 
critical statements about the Soviet System were expressed by British Statesmen3. 
These first discussions immediately showed the main topic that would divide Great 
Britain from Communist world: the fact that in East and Central Countries was 
underway a prolonged systematic campaign of vilification of democratic and 
liberal values. The recognition that the Soviets were pursuing a new ideological, 
economic and strategic imperialism, with the final aim of dominating the East and 
Central European countries, became the basis on which British Government shaped 
its policy towards the region.  
British politicians and diplomats from 1945 analyzed in detail what was 
going on beyond the Iron Curtain. And immediately, they recognized that Western 
Powers had no countermeasures to adopt, apart a new war that was practically 
impossible to sustain by weakened countries. Above all, London knew that two 
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deficiencies affected its bargaining position toward Romania and the Central and 
Eastern Nations, consequences of diplomatic mistakes made during the war years. 
Firstly, London was tied to the Potsdam Conference’s decisions: that was the peace 
settlements with the ex-enemy satellite States in South-East Europe had to be 
discussed first, even before a final statement over Germany’s future. Secondly, the 
Western Powers had put themselves in a weak diplomatic position accepting 
(in Three-Power Conferences at Teheran and Yalta) most of the territorial claims of 
the Soviet Union well before the discussion of the peace settlements began.  
Accepting these shortcomings, British politicians tried to find a possible 
solution. In a Cabinet meeting on 2nd January, 1947, the British Foreign Secretary, 
Ernest Bevin sustained that, since Soviet political prominence was unquestioned, 
London – in the first years after the end of the war – had tried to defend its 
economic interests in the area through diplomatic channels; and this tactic had to 
be keep going. At the very start of 1947, when political situation in East and 
Central States could seem not completely defined, someone supposed, as Bevin 
did, that those surviving Bulgarian, Hungarian and Romanian democratic 
authorities would realised the impossibility of their countries’ economic survival if 
they depend only on Soviet Union’s economy. This would open the doors for the 
safeguard of British trade with the East. Bevin said to his colleagues that if Great 
Britain had been able to take full advantage of the Treaties and handled the 
situation carefully, it would have been good prospects of re-establishing her trading 
connections with Eastern countries4. Thus, British Cabinet placed great hopes on 
the forthcoming Peace Treaties: 
 
“[The Balkan States] were not anxious to remain dependent on the Soviet 
economy; and the signature of the Treaties would give us good opportunities for re-
opening our trade with South-Eastern Europe. Surveys would at once be 
undertaken to assess the long-term possibilities of this trade”5. 
 
But, which were these economic ties that could be revived or newly 
interlaced? In the past, for example, Romanian oil wells had attracted British 
investments, but Bucharest had never been an agricultural products supplier, 
                                                 
4 Bevin noted that it was already evident that Great Britain would not be able to restore the 
pre-war position of British oil companies in Romania, although he noted that some improvements 
would depended on London ability to supply goods or credits craved by Communist States. See TNA, 
CAB 129/18/29, CP (47) 129, Revision of the Anglo-Soviet Treaty: Memorandum by the Prime 
Minister, Memorandum, 20th April 1947, Annex C, Copy of a Telegram Dated 11th April, 1947 Form 
Moscow to the Foreign Office. For these ideas see also TNA, CAB 128/9/1, CM (47), 1st Conclusion, 
Peace Treaties: Balkan States and Finland, Minute n° 1, 2nd January 1947; see also cf. TNA, CAB 
195/5/1, Foreign Affairs: Peace Treaties, CM 1(47), Note, 2nd January, 1947. 
5 TNA, CAB 128/9/2, CM (47), 2nd Conclusion, Peace Treaties: Balkan States and Finland, 
Minute n° 1, 6th January 1947. 
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because Romanian production was normally sent to Germany and Austria. Along 
1947 and until the final Communists’ seizure of power, British Cabinet discussed if 
there were chances that Bucharest could become an economic partner, despite her 
political condition as a Soviet political satellite. As the Ministry of Food, John 
Strachey, noted on 6th August, 1947 in a memorandum, the virtual disappearance of 
Germany and Austria as markets for food supplies had opened the possibility that 
the Danube basin’s countries could become provider of supply in a period when 
United Kingdom was suffering an heavy agricultural products shortage6. 
Nevertheless, the British Cabinet had to admit quickly that the Peace Treaties 
in Paris – signed in February 1947 – changed the situation, marking a negative 
turning point7. In Romania, like in all East and Central countries under Moscow 
control, the Treaty gave to Communist Party free hands to the final sovietisation of 
the country: having secured official diplomatic relations with the other nations, 
Communists in Bucharest and in Moscow had no reasons to worry about possible 
Western reactions to their anti-democratic initiatives8. Thus, in September, just few 
weeks before the Communists seized the power, Bevin won his Cabinet colleagues’ 
support to his strategy towards Romania, that was a appeasing one9. Patently, 
British Ministers tried to value if, thanks to this line, they could preserve the flimsy 
influence they believed Great Britain had in the country, and, thanks to this, 
safeguarding a possible market. With no doubts, the shortage of cereals that Great 
Britain was experiencing in those days had a role in this attitude10.  
                                                 
6 Strachey’s reflections in TNA, CAB 129/20/28, CP (47) 228, Development of New Sources 
of Food Supply: Memorandum by the Minister of Food, European Countries, Minute, 6th August 
1947. 
7 The signature of the Treaties of Peace as a turning point was described by the George VI 
himself in two speeches in TNA, CAB 129/21/32, CP (47) 282, Note by the Lord President of the 
Council, 10th October 1947, Annex I, Draft of The King’s Speech on the Prorogation of Parliament; 
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Communist régimes. Cf. TNA, CAB 128/10/27, CM (47), 76th Conclusion, Inter-Parliamentary 
Delegation to Roumania, Minute n° 2, 22nd September 1947. 
10 In a memorandum, Strachey deemed that Romania (like Russia) could be a possible source 
of coarse grain and maize supplies, but only if Great Britain was willing to furnish Bucharest with the 
British goods she wanted. These were steel, heavy electrical plant and other industrial manufacture of 
which the Balkan country badly needed. The absence of USSR and its satellites at the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Employment (held in Havana from 21st November, 1947, to 24th March, 
1948) with the target to settle the terms of an International Trade Organisation’s Charter had certified 
the end of dreams of a positive settlement with the Communist States in the international economic 
field. For these reflections see TNA, CAB 129/22/8, CP (47) 298, Cereals, 31th October 1947, 
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Sincerely, it is hard to understand how someone could foster any dream about 
the possibility of a clear separation between diplomacy and economics. If 
Bucharest was a political enemy, it could not be an economic partner, all the more 
in those dramatic days. Since Romania’s value as trade market could not be a large 
one, British Ministers felt themselves at a crossroads. The indignation caused by 
the underway repressive activities in Eastern Europe against the opposition parties 
and their leaders went side by side with the vital need of a military commitments 
reduction in the world. Actually, in those weeks the future British strategy towards 
the Eastern bloc was fully and finally outlined. The desire to achieve a significant 
loosening of the rising cold confrontation induced London in the following years to 
take significant initiatives from symbolic point of view, but not dangerous on 
political level. This was a strategy which brought London at odds with her 
American ally11. On 24th November 1947, Bevin admitted that the respect of 
human rights were not assured in Eastern bloc and the freedom of expression, of 
press and publication, of religious worship, of political opinion and of public 
meeting were denied12. The British Government had to carry on in promoting 
respect for human rights, because it could not, in public statements, take a line on 
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human rights in regard to Eastern Europe contradictory with the one it had taken at 
the United Nations in other occasions. Foreign Secretary noted that the belief in 
human rights and in liberties of Western democracy was part of British way of life 
and had to be defended, because it represented Great Britain in foreign countries 
more than anything else. 
“Our tacit denial of this cardinal article of faith in regard to Eastern Europe 
would immediately be remarked in the rest of Europe and in the Middle East, with 
disastrous effects”13. 
 
But, admitting British weak position of those days, Bevin recommended, first 
of all, that London did not give her support to any political faction asking for an 
uprising against the Soviet rule: 
 
“We have been scrupulously careful not to encourage subversive movements 
in Eastern European countries or anti-Russianism, or to lead the anti-Communists 
to hope for support which we cannot give. But we should continue […] to maintain 
our stand against totalitarianism in regard to Eastern Europe as elsewhere. This 
need not involve official protests through the diplomatic channel, but would be part 
and parcel of our attitude on this subject as shown in our publicity generally” 14. 
 
Bevin acknowledged that Great Britain had accepted, in Paris, a moral 
obligation towards Eastern Europe peoples, and doing nothing in support of them 
would place the United Kingdom in the wrong. At the same time, even if the 
United Nations had the courage to condemn the Communist authorities, there 
would be no means of enforcing upon them a greater respect for the human rights. 
Worst, “to use the Treaty machinery to try to enforce these obligations” would 
“serve merely to demonstrate its ineffectiveness”15. The immediate use of the 
enforcement machinery by His Majesty’s Government would so angered the 
Romanian Government and their Russian masters that they would retaliate by a 
further and more drastic purge of oppositions. Moreover, Bevin was sure that 
Bucharest would close British Legation as an act of retaliation, thereby annihilating 
its value as a centre of information. Thus, the Foreign Secretary concluded his 
analysis noting that  
                                                 
13 TNA, CAB 129/22/23, CP (47) 313, Extinction of Human Rights in Eastern Europe, 24th 
November 1947, Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. In those days the Labour 
Government was experiences a worsening in its relations with South Africa on the human rights’ 
issue. See TNA, CAB 129/42/14, CP (50) 214, Relations with the Union of South Africa: 
Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, 25th September, 1950, Annex, 
Telegram to Dr. Malan from Mr. Attlee; and TNA, CAB 129/43/72, CP (50) 322, Japanese Peace 
Treaty: Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 20th December, 1950. 
14 TNA, CAB 129/22/23, CP (47) 313, Extinction of Human Rights in Eastern Europe, 24th 
November 1947, Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. 
15 Ibidem. 
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“My conclusion therefore is that, while we should certainly use the full 
Treaty machinery at the right time, it would be premature to do so at this moment. 
We should certainly await the outcome of the Foreign Ministers Conference and 
I would not proceed against Roumania while King Michael’s position is in 
question. Our best course at this stage is to keep the matter alive on our side and at 
the same time keep our hands free”16.  
 
It is of the clearest evidence that, in supporting this line, Bevin had engaged 
Great Britain in a twofold strategy. On one hand, it was aimed to demonstrate to 
British public opinion the Government’s interest towards Eastern Europe’s 
situation, avoiding, on the other hand, increased tensions in the Continent that 
would have shown how weak Great Britain was in that moment, unable to change 
or, at least, influence the political situation in the Soviet bloc. 
Thus, at the start of 1948 the breakdown of the Council of Foreign Ministers 
brought to an end the residual British Ministers’ hope of a possible modus vivendi 
with Moscow. In a memorandum written on 6th January, 1948, the Secretary of 
State tried to pinpoint the Soviet strategy. While it was waiting a new conflict 
between the Capitalist States (caused by the Marshall Plan) Soviet Government 
would not change its policy, based on the assumption of two worlds in conflict; 
would continue to oppose to the Western reconstruction; and would continue to 
consolidate its own bloc. Since the former satellites of Germany were now USSR 
satellites, British relations with Eastern Europe was subject to Soviet and 
Communist political requirements and therefore liable to sudden interruptions. It 
was highly plausible that Moscow would use in the future the new condition as a 
way of bringing political pressure on United Kingdom, since Moscow-trained 
Communists and Soviet authorities effectively controlled the main European food-
producing areas. The Romanian case was the perfect example of this strategy, said 
Bevin, because the Soviet Union had made a complete mockery of Teheran and 
Yalta commitments in Romania, and, after the enforced abdication of King 
Michael in Romania, the Country could be considered completely lost by the 
democratic world17.  
It was the time to figure out a better strategy suited to counter the of 
Communist influence or power’s expansion in other parts of Europe and in the 
                                                 
16 Ibidem. An interesting account of Anglo-American attempt to change the tide, obstructing 
Groza’s political activity is in Paul Quinlan, Clash Over Rumania: British and American Policies 
towards Rumania, 1938-1947, American Romanian Academy of Arts and Sciences, Oakland, 1977, 
pp. 132-143.  
17 Bevin’s reflections in TNA, CAB 129/23/7, CP (48) 7, Review of Soviet Policy, 6th January 
1948, Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. An interesting account of 
Romania’s slipping into Communist hands is in Giuliano Caroli, Nascita di una democrazia popolare. 
La Romania dal 1944 al 1950 nei rapporti dei diplomatici italiani, Edizioni Periferia, Cosenza, 1999, 
pp. 71-77. 
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world18. First of all, London would have to sign the Benelux Treaty, which was 
judged a good political device against Moscow, and a necessary positive step in the 
international scene after the bad impression done with previous year’s retreat from 
any political and military commitments in Greece and Turkey, and, generally 
speaking, in Balkan area. Moreover: 
 
“Simultaneously with this, the whole problem of the co-ordination of efforts 
for the cultural, social, economic and financial revival and development of the west 
and for the defence of western civilization with the support of all friendly western 
Powers and of course of the Commonwealth should be proceeded with at once”19. 
 
It is important to underline that Bevin deemed cultural and social commit-
ments important as much as the economic and political ones. This was the strategy 
which was followed in subsequent years by British Governments towards the 
Soviet bloc. Together with the military contrast of any Soviet expansion of 
influence in the world, the use of culture as a political tool pointed out how Bevin 
and his colleagues had fully understood that from that moment onwards – within 
the blocks and between them – the culture would have been one of the most 
important means through which deciding the future of the world. It was not a 
coincidence that, in those weeks, showing their complete grasp of their society, the 
Communist leaders extended their control on local Churches. In particular, the 
Romanian Orthodox Church slipped quickly into Government’s hands, thanks to large 
purges, which get rid her of those who were considered opponents of the régime20. 
Furthermore (and this was a more decisive point suggesting the choice in favour of 
a British policy towards Romania and Eastern states based on cultural factors), 
during a following Cabinet meeting, George Tomlinson (the Minister of Education), 
noted that Great Britain could make use of spiritual values also as useful means 
                                                 
18 A particular emphasis, for example, was put by the Cabinet on the use of BBC as a 
fundamental propaganda means, through which it would have been possible to influence the foreign 
public opinion both in the West and in East. For this view see TNA, CAB 195/6/18, Foreign Policy in 
Europe, CM 19(48), Note, 5th March, 1948. 
19 TNA, CAB 129/25/12, CP (48) 72, The Threat to Western Civilisation, 3rd March 1948, 
Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. 
20 For this purges see Dennis Deletant, Communist Terror in Romania: Gheorghiu-Dej and the 
Police State, 1948-1965, Hurst & Company, London, 1999, pp. 89-90. When Justinian Marina was 
elected (by the Synod) Patriarch of Romania on 24th May, 1948, relations between State and 
Orthodox improved tremendously. Justinian and Gheorghiu-Dej had good personal relations dated 
from war period, and immediately the Patriarch accepted the régime. On his part, the Communist 
leader repaid the aid forcing the Catholic of Greek Rite back to Orthodox Church, a step acclaimed by 
the Holy Synod on 21st October, 1948. See Raoul V. Bossy, Religious Persecutions in Captive 
Romania, in “Journal of Central European Affairs”, vol. 15, n° 2, July 1955, pp. 168-169. The limits 
imposed on churches’ freedom was based on a legal support, The Law on Religious Confessions, 
enacted on 4th August, 1948, that reduced the sixty religious denominations previously recognised 
under the previous law of 1928 to fourteen and gave the control of the affairs of all churches in the 
country in the hands of Ministry of Cult (which become in 1957 Department of Cult). 
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against Marxism. Bevin suggested that the World Congress of Churches had been 
considered recently as a way through which Western values could be spread in the 
World. Notably, while the use of Protestant Churches was deemed to herald 
positive effects, an appeal to Vatican to use its political influence was ruled out by 
Foreign Office both for British internal and for Vatican-Romanian reasons21. It was 
in 1948 that the Roman Catholic Church (that was the Church of Hungarian 
minority) knew which would be her condition in a country ruled by Communists, 
that was of being tolerated, but unrecognised. The Vatican-Romanian relations 
were governed by a Concordat (concerning Roman Catholic and Greek Catholic 
communities) which had been concluded on 10th May 1927 and ratified in 1929. It 
was denounced by Gheorghiu-Dej on 22nd February 1948 and eventually abrogated 
on 17th July 1948 by an unilateral Romanian act22. All these facts were well-
acquainted in London. British Legations in Bucharest and in Rome sent regularly 
memorandums and notes to Foreign Office, describing reactions in Vatican milieu. 
In August 1949, despite the fact that Catholic authorities appeared really 
encouraged by the refusal of all local bishops (and most of the local priests) to 
acquiesce in the Marxist-Leninist attacks, no one could deny that the Church had 
suffered dismaying blows. At the same time, it was noted from Rome that, 
 
“In spite of these blows, the Catholic Church continues to plan in generations. 
The Secretariat of State at the Vatican expressed the view that good would come from 
the disgraceful subservience of the Orthodox Church to Communist Governments 
and from the demolishing of existing religions in the Soviet Union, since the 
inevitable destruction of the Soviet Government would leave a vacuum which the 
Catholic Church would have a good chance of filling”23. 
                                                 
21 Cf. TNA, CAB 195/6/18, Foreign Policy in Europe, CM 19(48), Note, 5th March, 1948. 
22 Cf. Hansjakob Stehle, Eastern Politics of the Vatican, 1917-1979, Ohio University Press, 
Athens (OH), 1981, p. 265. Romanian government noted that foreign religious cults could not 
exercise jurisdiction over faithful on the territory of Romanian state. Consequently, Bucharest was 
able to reduce the number of Roman Catholic dioceses from five to two, imposing preventive or 
illegal detention to almost all of Catholic Bishops, preventing them to fulfil their religious duty. A 
month later, with the education reforms of 3rd August 1948, confessional schools had been 
abolished and Catholic seminaries closed. In the years after, Roman Catholic newspapers and 
publications were suppressed, and a decree of 29th July 1949 abolished all Catholic orders and 
congregations. On 30th August 1949 an order was issued by which all monasteries and convents 
were to be completely evacuated, and Securitate agents were entrusted with the speedy execution 
of this order. After this, to the priests still at liberty the Ministry of Cults applied intense pressure. 
This happened via the creation of the Catholic Committee for Action whose task was to collect 
signature for the Stockholm Peace Appeal and to advocate the placing of the Catholic Church in 
Romania under the ultimate authority of the People’s Republic. Support for the committee was 
given at an assembly of Catholic priests and laymen held on 27th April 1950 in Târgu Mures, 
which was attended by Orthodox priests also. 
23 TNA, FO 371/79874, Perowne to Attlee, 3 August 1949, Minute n° 121 (124/1/49), f. Z 
5369/1011/57. 
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This kind of strategy was required for Great Britain too. London had to think 
and plan in generations, to recognize or improve every tools it had at its disposition 
and, first of all, had to renounce to any arranged bilateral action with Rome, 
probably damaging for London position versus Bucharest.  
The choice of distancing themselves from Rome proved a wisest one when, at 
the start of 1950, deadlock in the negotiation over Austrian Peace Treaty and 
tensions over Trieste and Germany showed that USSR had opted for a very 
aggressive posture towards the West24. Romania was a sort of rear guard of the 
front line embodied by Italy, West Germany and Austria25. And as such, Romania 
was ordered to silencing any opposite voices inside the country. Thus, local 
authorities stepped up their level of aggression against the Catholic Church. In 
August 1950, Communist Militias assaulted the Nunciature in Bucharest and 
occupied it. The Romanian authorities refused to allow Swiss to represent the 
Vatican interest (as Rome had arranged) and, in particular, to safeguard Catholic 
buildings. Bucharest justified its action with saying that National Government was 
forced to defend itself from the anti-Romanian activity done by the Nuncio26. 
Patently, the step was the local reaction to the Holy Office’s Decree (dated 1st July 
1949) forbidding membership of the Communist Party to Catholics under 
ecclesiastical penalties27. Thus, British Legation in Rome reported that no 
independent religious representatives were in Bucharest or in Romania, where the 
general situation for Catholic Church seemed even worst of those in Poland and 
Czechoslovakia28. 
                                                 
24 Communist attitude in the world in TNA, CAB 129/34/2, CP (49) 72, Communism in 
Countries Outside the Soviet Orbit: Note by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 24th March, 
1949. 
25 For this opinion see TNA, CAB 128/12/27, CM (48), 27th Conclusion, Austrian Peace 
Treaty, Minute n° 4, 8th April, 1948; and TNA, CAB 128/13/14, CM (48), 54th Conclusion, Foreign 
Affairs: Soviet Policy in Europe, Minute n° 4, 26th July, 1948. 
26 Cf. TNA, FO 371/88143, Chancery of British Legation in Bucharest to Bevin, 3 August 
1950, Dispatch n° 129 (1782/48/50), f. RR 1932/2. In the last months of 1950, a pamphlet entitled 
The Vatican, Infamous Instrument of the Warmongers accused Rome firstly of being a machine 
interested in making money without care of the means used for it; and secondly, she was alleged of 
being a Nazi and Fascist ally before 1939, a position that explained the reason why she had increased 
the hatred against Communism. It was for these reasons that any Catholic action had to be considered 
with attention and suspicion: the Catholic Church was very sensitive with power, it was said, and she 
was able to exploit secular authority to augment her position in the world. See TNA, FO 371/96285, 
Perowne to Bevin, 27 December 1950, Dispatch n° 146 (63/53/50), f. WV 1022/1. 
27 The Decree and its British translation in TNA, FO 371/79883, Perowne to Foreign Office, 
14 July 1949, Telegram n° 47 Saving, f. Z 4977/1027/57. 
28 See TNA, FO 371/89817, Foreign Office Research Department Memorandum, 13 December 
1949, Memorandum n° VAT/2/49, The Vatican and the “Iron Curtain” countries, f. WV 1022/1. 
Other informations on the issue were given to London by Perowne in TNA, FO 371/89815, Perowne 
to Bevin, 28 February 1950 (but received March 11), Minute n° 27, Holy See: Annual Report for 
1949, f. WV 1011/1. 
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The meanings of Romanian authorities actions – noted the British Cabinet – 
could be better understood having in mind the Soviet proposal for a new meeting of 
the Council of Foreign Ministers, aiming the restart of discussions about Potsdam 
Agreement on German demilitarisation. The step was the natural consequence of 
the previous year birth of two Germany as consolidated States. In a memorandum 
of 2nd December, 1950, Bevin admitted that there were tiny possibility that a deal 
with Moscow could be achieved on a demilitarized Germany, and a partial 
settlement also seemed difficult to be reached29. At the same time, no one could 
dream of the complete and final withdrawal of Red Army from Communist 
Satellites, followed by free elections supervised by United Nations, and it was not a 
surprise to note that cooperation proposals on German disarmament went together 
with an improvement of Soviet Union and her Satellites armed forces’ combat 
readiness30.  
In spring and summer of 1951 the new Labour Foreign Secretary, Herbert 
Morrison, emphasized the virulence of the propagandist attacks directed by Slav 
delegates against Western Powers during the Twelfth Session of the United Nations 
Economic and Social Council31. It was during this Cabinet discussion that 
Morrison suggested that the better counter-action of Communist warmongering 
was the simultaneous stepping up of the British propaganda, and this statement 
marked a new step along the way we are reconstructing in these notes. As a result, 
on 26th July 1951, the Cabinet discussed the importance of the British Council as a 
instrument of foreign policy. Analysing the experiences of its activities during the 
last five years, the Cabinet acknowledged that the Council (a non-governmental 
body) had familiarised foreign, colonial and Commonwealth peoples with the 
ideals, methods and achievements of United Kingdom. In doing so, it was 
recognized that it had given an important aid to the maintenance of the widest 
British political and trading influence, and that, if the Council did not exist, other 
agencies had to be supported by public funds for the same services. Thus, the 
British Ministers recommended that its existence should be prolonged indefinitely; 
that the non-official status of the Council had to be preserved; and that – in order to 
plan long-term works, to lease premises and to secure a fair proportion of staff on a 
                                                 
29 Bevin’s analysis in TNA, CAB 129/43/44, CP (50) 294, Soviet Proposal for a Meeting of 
the Council of Foreign Ministers: Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 2nd 
December, 1950. However, Great Britain and United States reacted differently about which position 
the West had to take on the Soviet proposal. Washington pressed for a stiff line against the USSR and 
her strategy in Europe and in Asia, while Bevin supported a flexible position, which, in his mind, 
could have ensured greater results.  
30 For this point see TNA, CAB 195/8/41, Coal, CM 19(50), Note, 6 November, 1950; and 
TNA, CAB 195/8/57, Defence Preparations, CM 2(51), Note, 15th January, 1951. 
31 The meeting was held at Santiago de Chile from 20th February to 21st March, 1951. See 
TNA, CAB 129/45/63, CP (51) 138, United Nations Economic and Social Council: Memorandum by 
the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 24th May, 1951, Trade Union Rights. 
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long-term basis – some form of stabilisation of its authorised expenditure could be 
envisaged32.  
 
“The task defined in the Council’s Charter as ‘promoting a wider knowledge 
of the United Kingdom’ is now in fact bound up with the wider task of defending 
Western civilisation against the inroads of communism by presenting a positive 
alternative. The Communist countries have paid their tribute to this by preventing 
the Council’s establishment in the U.S.S.R. and Roumania, and expelling it from 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Bulgaria”33. 
 
Sadly, British politicians had to admit that, in those unique days, the 
Council’s value behind the Curtain was at a low ebb. Communist control over local 
newspapers, radio and Churches in Eastern Europe and in Romania was a fait 
accompli, and this made their use impossible by British Council and its activities. 
Thus, London had to evaluate the employ of other political, diplomatic or 
propagandistic means. From that moment onwards, British Ministers paid attention 
to every channels that could be used with no arm to relations with Communist 
countries. One of these devices could have been the radio broadcastings over the 
Curtain. On 25th March, 1952, after Conservative return to power, the new Foreign 
Secretary, Anthony Eden, described in the Cabinet the Foreign Office and his 
opinion on BBC’s role in the ongoing Cold War. From 1947, London had rejected 
the American strategy towards the Eastern bloc based on the idea that West radios 
had to bring the peoples to revolt against the Communist authorities34. British 
officials knew perfectly that, if those revolts had erupted, the Western bloc could 
do nothing in supporting them. A better job could have been done by radios and 
their aired programs in keeping alive in minds of Eastern population crucial 
Western democratic values. BBC had received accurate instructions on this line 
and it did an excellent work so far. The better proof of this was given by the Soviet 
                                                 
32 It could be interesting to note that an “aggressive” British Council’s policy was suggested 
for Italy and the Vatican. The latter, in particular, seemed well disposed towards every leaflet and 
materials that could explain, not only in Europe but also in other Continents, the importance of a stiff 
contrast against Communism. Cf. TNA, FO 924/945, Finch to Johnstone, 7 May 1951, Dispatch w.r., 
f. CRL 1221/3. 
33 In particular, both the Brussels Treaty and the Council of Europe were involved in 
supporting cultural activities, and British Government had placed British Council of taking charge of 
them; and the Council was British Government’s principal nominated agency for the implementation 
of cultural conventions signed since the war. For this reflections see TNA, CAB 129/47/6, CP (51) 
231, Future of the British Council: Memorandum by the Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs, 
Colonies and Commonwealth Relations, 26th July, 1951, Appendix, The British Council’s 
Organisation: Relation to Government Departments and Method of Work. 
34 For a study on this issue cf. Paul D. Quinlan (ed.), The United States and Romania: 
American-Romanian Relations during the Twentieth Century, American Romanian Academy of Arts 
and Sciences, Woodland Hills, 1988, particularly pp. 97-104. 
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jamming activities, which were trying to disrupt radio communications from West 
to East. Speaking with his colleagues, Eden backed the idea that Exchequer would 
have to pay for counter jamming, thus permitting the BBC programs to be received 
behind the Curtain35. At the end of July 1952, Eden, commenting a report of a 
Committee which had investigated the activities of the Overseas Information 
Services, regretted that from December 1951 to May 1952 stubborn jamming 
operations had been steadily extended to the point where they affect all BBC 
services to Russia, Poland, Finland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Albania, Bulgaria 
and Romania. The principal means of combating or circumventing the menace was 
the radiation of each service on the maximum number of transmitters that could be 
made available in simultaneous operation on different waves. This involved heavy 
expenditures which, compared with those required for normal operations, were 
relatively unprofitable. But there were no alternatives if not to accept defeat36. 
This was the situation when, on 29th July, 1952, Eden received a letter from 
the British chargé d’Affaires in Bucharest, Horatio Kevin Matthews. In it, 
Matthews described to his Minister the Anglican Church’s edifice conditions in 
                                                 
35 Cf. TNA, CAB 129/50/39, C (52) 89, The British Broadcasting Corporation’s External Services: 
Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 25th March, 1952. Another important Foreign 
Secretary’s memorandum on Overseas Information Services at the end of July 1952 reiterated the 
propaganda warfare importance. Eden directed his colleagues’ attention to the fact that British overseas 
publicity had played a very substantial part in the manifest weakening of Communist influence in Western 
Europe recently. Consequently, in his speech he supported the request of the Committee that more funds 
was given to the OIS. Eden suggested that the so called “common ceiling” for overseas information 
expenditure could be abolished, because it damaged the office’s ability in counter-acting Communist threat. 
It was a clear proof of his belief that the international situation demanded an intensification of OIS work 
and a measure of continuity in its financing in order to permit operations to be so planned as to produce 
their full cumulative effect. See Cf. TNA, CAB 129/54/9, C (52) 259, Overseas Information Services: 
Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 24th July, 1952, The Overseas Information 
Services: Report by Committee of Enquiry, 14th July, 1952, Annex I, Overseas Publicity, Chapter VIII: The 
External Services of the British Broadcasting Corporation. The importance of BBC was increased by the 
fact that the freedom of action of diplomatic service was limited if not badly damaged by Communist 
authorities. The Foreign Secretary, a couple of weeks before the above mentioned discussion on BBC’s 
role, had obtained the Cabinet’s support in his decision of restricting some Communist diplomatic 
representatives freedom of movement in London. These restrictions had been imposed as a retaliation for 
similar restrictions to which British diplomatic representatives were subjected in the Soviet Union, Romania 
and Bulgaria. The Soviet Ambassador and the Romanian and Bulgarian Ministers in London had been 
notified that neither they nor the members of their staffs were allowed to travel more than twenty-five miles 
from Hyde Park Corner without notifying the Foreign Office forty-eight hours in advance. See TNA, CAB 
128/24/29, CC (52), 29th Conclusion, Travel Restrictions on Diplomatic Representatives of Soviet and 
Satellite Governments, Minute n° 5, 12th March 1952. 
36 Cf. TNA, CAB 129/54/9, C (52) 259, Overseas Information Services: Memorandum by the 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 24th July, 1952, The Overseas Information Services: Report by 
Committee of Enquiry, 14th July, 1952, Annex I, Overseas Publicity, Chapter VIII: The External 
Services of the British Broadcasting Corporation. 
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Romanian capital37. They were a growing concern both to the Church Committee 
and to the small British and American Protestant communities living in the city. 
During the previous winter, it had become clear that repairs to the edifice could not 
much longer be delayed and the British representative noted that such refurbishing 
were needed first and foremost because the Church was the only material 
expression of the local Anglo-Saxon communities’ spiritual life38. In this 
circumstances, Matthews ventured to ask whether it was possible for Foreign 
Office and Ministry of Treasury to assist the Legation in preserving the Church. He 
knew that arrangements subscribed by His Majesty’s Government when the 
building was vested, in 1912, provided that no pecuniary liability could be ascribed 
on Church of England’s (and thus, on Government’s) shoulders. But in 1912 the 
Church in Bucharest was supported by a large and flourishing British colony, 
which had virtually disappeared after the Communist seizure of power. A close 
political reflection induced Matthews in supporting the refitting plan of the Church. 
The building was situated in a busy thoroughfare of Bucharest and: 
 
“From the crowds which collect outside the church on such occasions as the 
Memorial Service for His late Majesty, when the entire Western Diplomatic Corps 
attended, it is obvious that the existence and continued use of the building are 
known and appreciated by many in Bucharest. I venture to submit that it would be 
little short of a catastrophe to allow decay to overtake this unique monument, 
testifying as it does to British endeavour; to our sense of spiritual values; and to our 
firm belief in the freedom of worship, which the Communist régime in this country 
has reduced to such a travesty”39.  
 
It seems clear that all the basic elements of the discussions within the Foreign 
Office on the necessity of a propaganda warfare against the Communism and the 
need of the preservation of every devices in British hands were already contained 
in Matthews’ dispatch.  
In order to strengthen his request, on 31st July, 1952, Matthews sent another 
letter, this time to Littlejohn Cook (of the Northern Department) summarizing the 
                                                 
37 The Anglican Church of the Resurrection is a church located in central Bucharest, near 
Grădina Icoanei, at the intersection of Xenopol street and Arthur Verona street. The church is built 
with red bricks. The land over which the church was built was given by the Bucharest borough to the 
British Crown in December 1900, the erection of the building being completed in 1914, but the 
interiors (with furnishings from England) were finished only after World War I. The first service was 
held in 1920, being dedicated on November 5, 1922, by the Bishop of Gibraltar. It must be 
remembered that the Diocese under which the church was submitted was the Gibraltar’s one. 
38 It is appropriate to bear in mind that the Chargé d’Affaires, as diplomatic representative of 
United Kingdom’s ruler, the Queen (who was the Head of the Church of England), was ex officio 
Chairman of the Church Committee. 
39 TNA, FO 371/100789, Matthews to Eden, 29th July 1952, Letter n° 77 (1781/20/52), f. NR 
1782/1. 
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situation and underling, once again, the urgency of repairs not only for religious 
reasons, but also for the “strong political complexion” the maintenance works 
brought with itself40.  
The letter caused a broad discussion within the Foreign Office. On 9th 
August, 1952 Littlejohn Cook supported Matthews’ request, hoping that it was 
possible to win the Ministry of Works and Treasury’s cooperation with the 
Conference and Supply Department. The theme, he noted, had important political 
implications: 
“I can only add that, from a political point of view, the arguments [...] of 
Mr. Matthews’ despatch are no overstatement; a grant towards the upkeep of the 
church would not be a simple act of charity but would contribute to the 
maintenance of an institution whose existence plays some part in the execution of 
H.M.G.’s policy in Roumania”41. 
 
As it was noted by another British expert, it would be a most unfortunate 
event for British prestige in Romania and a victory for the Romanian Communist 
régime if the Church were closed merely for savings 650 pounds (the sum needed 
for refit the building)42.  
A week later, it emerged that the Gibraltar Diocesan Office (the body that 
had to supervise the edifice administration) had no funds immediately available. 
With a letter of 29th July, 1952, Matthews had warned the Bishop of Gibraltar, 
stroking the cord of the religious comfort and spiritual consolation granted by the 
Church to the Anglican believers. Simultaneously, he had not hidden the political 
consideration which fostered the maintenance of the Church, asking for a close 
cooperation between the Bishop’s Office and the Foreign Office43. In reaction of 
Matthews’ letter, the Anglican Church assured that, if British Government had not 
been able to provide support, steps would be taken to appeal privately for founds.  
“The Canon [C.H.R. Cocup, Bishop of Gibraltar’s collaborator] said that if a 
public appeal could be made, the money would be collected easily, but he felt that 
it would be harmful politically and embarrassing for the Legation of H.M.G.”44. 
                                                 
40 TNA, FO 371/100789, Matthews to Littlejohn Cook, 31st July 1952, Dispatch n° 81/21/52, 
f. NR 1782/2. 
41 TNA, FO 371/100789, Littlejohn Cocks’s Note, 9th August 1952, f. NR 1782/1. 
42 On 26th August, 1952, Shuckburgh, who was in those days Principal Private Secretary to the 
Foreign Secretary, underlined how much embarrassing and deplorable could be the fact that His 
Majesty’s Government was unable to give some contribution supporting the Church rebuilding 
through the official channels. This position in TNA, FO 371/100789, Shuckburgh’s Note, 26th August 
1952, f. NR 1782/1. 
43 See TNA, FO 371/100789, Matthews to Bishop of Gibraltar, 29th July 1952, Letter n° 
1781/19/52, f. NR 1782/2. 
44 TNA, FO 371/100789, Foreign Office’s Note, 19th August 1952, f. NR 1782/1. 
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Leaving the reflections of possible political consequences of a public appeal 
to diplomacy, anyway, Cocup added that the Anglican Church would not let the 
Church fall down for lack of founds. 
Lambeth Road’s position partially reassured British diplomats. Given that the 
Anglican Church could collect probably 400 pounds out of 650, Whitehall argued 
that the remaining sum had to be provided by itself for the political reasons 
emphasised previously by Matthews and Littlejohn Cocks in their notes, although 
there were some members of the Office who thought that there would be great 
problems in obtaining Treasury’s permission to the expenditures45. The state of 
affair was summarized in a Foreign Office’s memorandum at the end of August. 
 
“The closure of the Anglican Church would be a misfortune from the point of 
view of British prestige; it would be a victory for the Communist régime in 
Roumania which has been successful in eliminating nearly all other manifestations 
of Western culture in Bucharest”46. 
 
The political value of the small institution emerged in memo’s pages. The 
author noted that under discussion was not only British prestige, but also the 
British propaganda strategy in the country. 
 
“The question is, however, not merely one of prestige or of assisting the 
church as a British institution in a foreign country, but is one of keeping alive an 
institution which in the absence of normal British Council and information 
activities plays an important part in testifying to British endeavour, our sense of 
values, and our confirmed belief in the freedom of worship which the Communist 
régime in Roumania has reduced to such a travesty’”47. 
 
Thus, the Foreign Office strongly supported any efforts for the repair of the 
building, even in the case that it had to be conducted directly by the British 
government itself. Rather, it supported the Government’s direct engagement, 
because a public appeal for collecting founds would have been embarrassing for 
London and her Legation in Bucharest, as highlighted in internal notes previously48. 
According to the Foreign Office experts a better action could have been an 
approach to the Treasury at ministerial level, and, through this way, understanding 
if there were chances to obtain Government’s funds. 
                                                 
45 See TNA, FO 371/100789, Foreign Office’s Note, 22nd August 1952, f. NR 1782/1. 
46 TNA, FO 371/100789, Foreign Office’s Minute, w.d. (but after 26th August 1952), w.r., 
f. NR 1782/1. 
47 TNA, FO 371/100789, Foreign Office’s Minute, w.d. (but after 26th August 1952), w.r., 
f. NR 1782/1. 
48 What is more, it was noted that “If therefore, H.M.G. could provide a grant towards the 
present essential repairs, the Foreign Office would be in a better position to support the church’s 
request in the Diocese for a regular contribution towards its current expenditure”. Ibidem.  
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Such a position was sustained by the British Minister in Bucharest also, who 
feared long delays in London49. Having received an official assurance that the 
Bishop of Gibraltar would have not allowed the building’s ruin50, Littlejohn Cook 
replied to Matthews that, while Foreign Office’s approach to the Treasury was 
under consideration and the possibilities of public funds support remained 
uncertain, the support of the Gibraltar Diocesan Office was sure51. Moving deftly, 
the British Legation advised – always through a Matthews’ letter to London – that, 
taking the cue from Littlejohn Cook’s letter, they were ready to start immediately 
the more urgent repairs. This step opened the way to another problem, that caused 
some troubles in the years ahead. Matthews asked London a free hand to use – 
temporarily – the Legation’s public funds for the payment of the contractor, while 
waiting the Diocese’s money to write off the debt balance52. 
Practically, in September 1952 this was the state of affairs: while British 
Legation had started the building’s repair, having received the green light from 
Whitehall at least for the most urgent refurbishing, the Foreign Office was engaged 
with its pressure for obtaining Treasury’s economic support for the whole 
renovation. As a result, Hohler (Head of Foreign Office Northern Department) sent 
to Drake (of the Treasury) a note having the purpose to win the Treasury sympathy 
towards the fate of the building. Hohler did not hide the scanty number of the 
Protestant worshippers in 1952 in Bucharest, but he emphasised the cogent political 
reasons which suggested the edifice preservation, namely the well-known interest 
in preserving a small but significant cultural (and political) stronghold. The 
Church’s building was a place of people’s gathering in particular occasions, such 
as the latest memorial service for George VI.  
 
“Its closure would be a minor victory for the Communist régime and a blow 
to British prestige in Roumania. The church provides a means of expressing our 
sense of spiritual values and our belief in freedom of worship, and this is all the 
more important since the British Council and the Information Office were obliged 
to cease functioning in Roumania several years ago”53. 
                                                 
49 The request in TNA, FO 371/100789, Matthews to Littlejohn Cook, 28th August 1952, Letter 
n° 1781/24/52, f. NR 1782/3. 
50 Cf. TNA, FO 371/100789, Foreign Office Note, 1st September 1952, f. NR 1782/3. 
51 See TNA, FO 371/100789, Littlejohn Cook to Matthews, 3rd September 1952, Dispatch w.r., 
f. NR 1782/3. 
52 Matthews thought that the Diocesan Office could not be able to give the sum required for 
contractor’s payment, while it would not be possible for the Legation to keep the contractor waiting 
for payment when works had been finished. These reflections in TNA, FO 371/100789, Matthews to 
Northern Department, Foreign Office, 4 September 1952, Dispatch n° 1781/26/52, f. NR 1782/4. 
53 TNA, FO 371/100789, Holhler to Drake, 8th September 1952, Dispatch n° G.S.L-C. 5/9, f. NR 
1782/1. The letter ended exploring two solutions to the problem. Firstly, it stated Hohler’s hope that it 
would be possible for the Treasury or the Board to make a grant from public funds of 550 pounds to 
cover the whole cost of the repairs. Secondly, another solution could be represented by the availability of 
one of ministries to provide a grant of 400 pounds which would enable the Church Committee to execute 
the minimum repairs before the winter arrived. Thanks to this, it was possible that the Diocese of 
Gibraltar could be induced to give the remaining 150 pounds to complete the works. 
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From that moment to the end of September, continuing contacts between 
Foreign Office and Treasury went on. The latter, in proposing a sort of loan to the 
Diocese, showed its fear that, giving a positive answer to an official help, it could 
open the road to other requests of the same kind54. Not surprisingly, Whitehall tried 
to slow down every refitting activity in Bucharest and firstly recommended 
Matthews not to do what the Minister had proposed in his letter of 4th September, 
unless the Diocese of Gibraltar had given its good disposition in writing to make 
the necessary refund permitting thus a quick repayment; and, secondly, it decided 
for a direct approach to Gibraltar Diocesan Office55. 
The British Legation did not comply. On 25th September 1952, the British 
Minister at Bucharest, William Sullivan, wrote to Finance Department remarking 
that, due to the approaching rainy season, the Legation had already started the 
works on the Church building. He added that he had been encouraged by previous 
Foreign Office telegrams and by a letter from the Bishop of Gibraltar in which 
Horsely wrote that he would do whatever was in his power to get the money to 
Bucharest. Inter alia, the British Minister noted: 
 
“It is more than fortunate that the repairs have already been done for it 
appears that the local authorities are intent upon breaking up the small building 
cooperative which has done so much for the Legation”56. 
And this Romanian’s behaviour – concluded Sullivan – witnessed not only a 
tougher position towards a building cooperative (in consequence of internal reasons 
that were not better explained), but also an obvious concern of the local Ministry of 
Interior for the role the Anglican building had within Bucharest society, offering an 
ideal stronghold for freedom that had to be checked and, if possible, quickly stifled. 
The Foreign Office’s pressure gained the upper hand with the Treasury. 
Between 24th September and 16th of October, Pimley – who was a Treasury’s 
official in touch with Whitehall colleagues – was able to found a precedent which 
justified a public support to the renovation of the Anglican Church in Bucharest, 
                                                 
54 Cf. TNA, FO 371/100789, Foreign Office Note, 12th September 1952, f. NR 1782/4. 
55 A step that the Foreign Office had not yet done because it was waiting the Treasury’s reply. 
See TNA, FO 371/100789, Northern Department, to Matthews, 16th September 1952, Letter w.r., f. 
NR 1782/4.  
56 TNA, FO 371/100789, Sullivan to Rance, 25th September 1952, Letter 1781/29/52, f. NR 
1782/5. Apart from the cooperative owner’s fate (it seemed that he, named Frank, was daily expecting 
to be arrested, although the authorities had been unable to prove that he had infringed the law), the 
very fact was that the local authorities seemed to be less friendly towards the building’s future. As 
Sullivan noted, “If, therefore, Frank’s team had not done the repairs we should, if their services were 
removed, have had to request the assistance of the local Burobin. This office would probably have 
refused to carry out the work; and even if the task had been eventually accepted, the charge would 
have been very much (perhaps several times) higher than Frank’s”. 
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clearing the way for a positive acceptance of the Foreign Office’s request57. 
Nevertheless, when Drake replied to Hohler’s letter of the 8th September on 7th 
October, 1952, the Treasury’s support went altogether with two conditions:  
“(i) It cannot be taken to imply that we admit any liability for the running 
expensed of the Church; (ii) That details of the proposed repairs ad submitted to the 
Ministry of Works for scrutiny”58. 
 
Apparently, Sullivan’s letter of 25th of September had cleared the way for a 
quick solution59, which gave to the Legation the authorization to spend 550 pounds 
from public funds60. This positive solution was facilitated, surely, by the peculiar 
condition of the ongoing Cold War in which Great Britain was playing a significant 
part. The deepening of the propaganda warfare seemed increasingly a necessity, 
because there were signs of growing economic difficulties in USSR and her 
satellites. At the end of 1952 the breakdown of the economic plans in Eastern Europe 
surfaced, causing internal divisions in Communist Parties. At the same time, trials in 
Czechoslovakia (the Slansky process, first of all) showed that the Communists 
disliked excessive concentrations of power in one man or groups, noted Eden61. 
                                                 
57 Informations on Pimley’s activity in TNA, FO 371/100789, Foreign Office Note, 24th 
September 1952, f. NR 1782/4; TNA, FO 371/100789, Foreign Office Note, 30th September 1952, 
f. NR 1782/4; and, first of all, TNA, FO 371/100789, Pinlay to Minshall, 16 October 1952, Letter n° 
IF 99/610/01, f. NR 1782/7.  
58 TNA, FO 371/100789, Drake to Hohler, 7th October 1952, Letter IF.99/610/01, f. NR 1782/6.  
59 The Legation was informed of Treasury’s acceptance with a telegram. Cf. TNA, FO 371/100789, 
Foreign Office to Chancery of British Legation at Bucharest, 9th October 1952, Telegram n° 190, f. NR 
1782/6. 
60 See TNA, FO 371/100789, Hutchinson’s Note, 10th October 1952, f. NR 1782/6. Thus, 
Littlejohn Cook wrote to Sullivan reporting Treasury’s authorisation to expenditure from public funds 
and also the Ministry of Works’ request for full details of the expenditure. Littlejohn Cook’s letter in 
TNA, FO 371/100789, Littlejohn Cook to Sullivan, 11th October 1952, Letter w.r., f. NR 1782/6. 
Sullivan’s thanks to Littlejohn Cook and the expenditure amount of refurbishing in TNA, FO 
371/100789, Sullivan to Littlejohn Cook, 16th October 1952, Letter n° 1781/33/52, f. NR 1782/8. All 
these informations were redirected to Gilchrist with an Hutchinson’s letter of 24th October, 1952 in 
TNA, FO 371/100789, Hutchinson to Gilchrist, 24th October 1952, Letter w.r., f. NR 1782/8. 
61 Eden was wrong in his prediction, since Communists disliked, surely in those days, any form 
of dissention against leading groups in their countries. A recent analysis of British foreign policy is in 
Robert Self, British Foreign and Defence Policy since 1945: Challenges and Dilemmas in a Changing 
World, Macmillan Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2010; Eden’s policy towards Eastern countries is analysed in 
Robert D. Thorpe, Eden: The Life and Time of Anthony Eden, First Earl of Avon, 1897-1977, Pimlico, 
London, 2004, p. 315 and following. With reference to trials in Czechoslovakia and, generally speaking, 
about political conditions and facts that were underway in those months in Eastern Europe see Tony 
Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945, Penguin Press, New York, 2005, pp. 185-186. The 
Foreign Secretary’s analysis is also in TNA, CAB 195/11/2, Foreign Affairs, CC 102(52), Note, 4th 
December, 1952. Incidentally, it could be interesting to note that the Conservative Government faced the 
same problems the Labours had in the trade relations with the Eastern bloc. Generally speaking, Great 
Britain had to reconcile two different needs. Firstly, she needed to trade with foreign nations (the Eastern 
ones included) in order to earn valuable currency improving in this way her balance of payments; 
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Similar trials were predictable in Romania and Hungary. Thus, it was deemed that 
having means able to reach people in Communist countries appeared even more 
valuable if not essential. The BBC came out increasingly as a central device in 
such a confrontation. On 13th November, 1953, the Drogheda Committee 
corroborated and strengthened this opinion, saying that broadcasting seemed even 
more important because it was the only channel through which British could do 
political warfare, trying to reach people beyond the Iron Curtain62. But, at the same 
time, with the British international radio programmes in continuous trouble, 
especially in Romania (due to the distance that separate it from the Western 
Europe), the role of the Anglican Church’s building in Bucharest seemed even 
more central to the Foreign Office. When the recently appointed new Bishop of 
Gibraltar, Frederick William Thomas Craske, after his visit to Bucharest earlier in 
1954, asked once more a support from Whitehall to the Diocese in order to 
guarantee certain urgent repairs to the Church building, the Ministry reacted 
quickly: a telegram to Bucharest was sent on 16th July, 1954, in which was stated 
that the British Legation would have to begin the repair work, since 720 pounds 
would be guaranteed63. Subsequently, Hohler sent to the new British Minister to 
Romania, Sir Dermot F. MacDermot, a more detailed letter, clarifying the reasons 
supporting the Ministry decision. He wrote that Craske deemed that the repairs 
could amount to 1.200 pounds, and, although some of them could be deferred until 
the Church were in a position to meet the cost, the most urgent intervention would 
cost 900 pounds. The congregation of the Church had collected 180 pounds yet, 
leaving 720 to be found by the Gibraltar diocese. But, this time also as two years 
before, the Diocese could not find the sum without making a special appeal, and, in 
Craske’s opinion, causing the political consequences previously envisaged, first of 
all for his own person. 
 
“In this he felt severely embarrassed, since if an appeal were to be effective, 
he and the Clergy of Gibraltar diocese would need to lay considerable stress on the 
                                                                                                                            
secondly, she did not want to furnish strategic assets to Communist bloc. The ongoing adjustments of the 
embargo list led in September 1952 of a restriction of grant export licenses for goods in many countries, 
Romania included. This discussion and the list of goods under embargo in TNA, CAB 129/54/47, C (52) 
297, East-West Trade – Prior Commitments: Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs 
and the President of the Board of Trade, 10th September, 1952. 
62 The Committee asked the Government to rise the founds offered to broadcasting activities, 
because, in order to overcome Russian jamming against BBC transmissions, the service had had to 
discontinue or reduce transmissions to other parts of the world, thus releasing the necessary 
transmitters and frequencies which were needed for the purpose. This had had adverse effects on their 
programmes to the Middle East, America, Europe and Africa. Because the anti-jamming measures 
cost £125,000 a year, the Drogheda Committee asked for a new injection of money in BBC’s budget. 
These reflections in TNA, CAB 129/64/5, C (53) 305, Overseas Information Services: Report of the 
Drogheda Committee, 13th November, 1953, VII, Financial Requirements. 
63 See TNA, FO 371/111658, Foreign Office to Chancery of British Legation at Bucharest, 
16th July 1954, Telegram n° 134, f. NR 1782/1. 
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fact that the Church at Bucharest was what he termed a ‘lantern in the darkness’. 
This would inevitably come to the ears of the Roumanians, and would severely 
prejudice his chances of obtaining a visa for Roumania in future – quite apart from 
the embarrassment in which it might place Her Majesty’s Legation”64. 
Hohler went on saying that the need of acting aptly was made more 
indispensable by well-known political reasons: 
 
“[We] had reason to believe that, on political grounds, both we in the Foreign 
Office and you at Bucharest attached importance to the continued maintenance and 
use of the Church building. It seemed to him that to allow it to fall into disrepair, or 
to be taken over by the Roumanians, would be a severe blow to British prestige”65. 
 
The British expert admitted the considerable importance of Bishop’s opinion 
and asked for a formal dispatch from Bucharest which, setting out the case for 
assistance from public funds, could enable Whitehall to ask the Treasury’s 
economic support. 
On 4th August, 1954, MacDermot passed on his request for a financial help 
and this time he addressed directly it to Eden himself. Noting that the history of the 
Church had been closely bound up with the friendly relations which marked 
British-Romanian affairs before the Communist seizure of power, the diplomat 
stressed that, although the English Church was not an integral part of Her 
Majesty’s Legation, the building was nevertheless the property of Her Majesty’s 
Government in the same degree as the edifice in which the Legation offices were 
housed, as the Ministry of Works’ had acknowledged. MacDermot repeated once 
again the Church’s high value, because it was the almost unique visible sign of the 
way of life and spiritual values for which the West and United Kingdom stand. 
“An indication of its standing in the eyes of the local Roumanian Community 
is provided by the small but steady stream of visitors who quietly enter the Church 
during the course of services and, after making their obeisance and staying a few 
minutes to pay their devotions, leave quietly and respectfully”66. 
 
Although there had been signs of a sort of de-escalation in political and 
diplomatic relations between two blocs, political condition inside each Communist 
states remained intolerable for every dissenting voices. The surviving popular 
sympathies towards the Anglican institution showed both the respect to British 
                                                 
64 TNA, FO 371/111658, Hohler to MacDermot, 24th July 1954, Letter w.r., f. NR 1782/1. 
65 Ibidem. 
66 TNA, FO 371/111658, MacDermot to Eden, 4th August 1954, Dispatch n° 78 (1782/52/54), 
f. NR 1782/2. MacDermot advised Hohler of this step in TNA, FO 371/111658, MacDermot to 
Hohler, 4th August 1954, Letter n° 1782/53/54, f. NR 1782/1.  
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society and Nation, and the deep dissatisfaction of Romanians with local policy. 
So, all political and religious factors counselling for the preservation of the 
Anglican building became the more and more fortified: 
 
“These are but slender signs of what I have suggested is not inconsiderable, if 
intangible, token of British traditions and the respect that is shown to them. I can 
therefore only conclude that if the English Church was to fell into disrepair (and 
possibly therefore be taken over by the Roumanians) or was obliged to close its 
doors, it would be a very severe reflection on British prestige”67. 
 
MacDermot, because he was addressing directly Eden, summed up what was 
written before between London and himself, firstly noting he had appealed to the 
Bishop of Gibraltar for the sum and, secondly, his worries about the possibilities 
that the Diocese’s public petition would have prejudiced the chances of the Bishop 
of Gibraltar to obtain a visa to Romania, embarrassing, at the same time, the 
Legation.  
 
“In these circumstances it is, I feel, appropriate to urge that the value of the 
Church as a ‘standard bearer’ for our way of life, amid the black materialism of this 
Communist régime, justifies expenditure from public funds in order to keep that 
flag flying”68. 
 
At the same time, the British Minister could not deny that the local 
community had no other means to use for the purpose: 
 
“To sum up, it seems fair to say that locally we have reached the limit of the 
financial contributions which we can raise, and the total is not unworthy; the 
Diocese has responded magnificently to our appeal for help, but has clearly 
accepted a commitment which, without external assistance, will put an impossible 
strain on its tenuous resources. In these circumstances I venture to appeal for 
assistance from public funds: only this can maintain what is almost the only 
surviving public token in this country of British spiritual values and our belief in 
the freedom of association and worship”69. 
 
In addition, on 10th August the British Legation in Bucharest wrote to the 
Finance Department asking the authority to pick up the cost of the renovation from 
British Legation’s quarterly accounts in anticipation of the Diocese of Gibraltar’s 
refunds70. 
                                                 
67 TNA, FO 371/111658, MacDermot to Eden, 4th August 1954, Dispatch n° 78 (1782/52/54), 
f. NR 1782/2. 
68 Ibidem. 
69 Ibidem. Attached to the file there was a list of the repairs foreseen by the Legation 
70 The request was done with reference to the Foreign Office telegram n° 134 of July 16th. See 
TNA, FO 371/111658, Chancery of British Legation at Bucharest to Finance Department, Foreign 
Office, 10th August 1954, Dispatch n° 1782/55/54, f. NR 1782/3. 
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As had happened previously, also this time the Archbishop’s attitude eased the 
situation, and allowed the affair to take a step forward. A week later, the guarantee 
for the funds was personally ensured by the Bishop of Gibraltar71; and at the end of 
the month, Northern Department advised Bucharest that the cost could be shown in 
Legation’s quarterly account as requested72. This good disposition of the Foreign 
Office arrived despite the Treasury had made it clear in 1952 that its help would have 
been a one-off support, on the understanding that repairs to the Anglican Church 
were not going to be a recurring item and that details of those repairs were submitted 
to the Ministry of Works for scrutiny and approval73. In doing so, Hohler recurred 
once more on the well-known argument that if the Diocese of Gibraltar was forced to 
make a special appeal for collecting the sum this would have created problem for the 
British Government with the Romanian authorities, extinguishing the chance of 
obtaining visas for Anglican clergy to visit the country in future.  
 
“I should add that the Archbishop of Canterbury has recently written to the 
Foreign Secretary commending the religious activities of our Embassies and 
Legation behind the Iron Curtain and stressing the importance of their efforts. I 
have no doubt that you will wish to bear this in mind when considering the 
particular case of Bucharest”74. 
 
It must be noted, to avoid misunderstanding, that the need to preserve the 
opportunity for British citizens to obtain visas for entry into Romania was not a 
trifle or a superficial excuses. And this is proved by a letter sent from Chancery 
Legation in Bucharest to the Legation in Rome on 30th September, 195475. In the 
letter it was noted that MacDermot had recently received from the Archdeacon of 
Malta, Frederick Bailey, the proposal of a visit to Bucharest in November76.  
                                                 
71 See TNA, FO 371/111658, Brown Note, 17th August 1954, f. NR 1782/3. 
72 Cf. TNA, FO 371/111658, Northern Department, Foreign Office to Chancery of British 
Legation at Bucharest, 24th August 1954, Dispatch w.r., f. NR 1782/3. 
73 The fear of the Foreign Office’s official in TNA, FO 371/111658, Foreign Office Note, 19th 
August 1954, f. NR 1782/2. 
74 TNA, FO 371/111658, Hohler to Drake, 24th August 1954, Letter w.r., f. NR 1782/2. 
75 Cf. TNA, FO 371/111658, Chancery of British Legation at Bucharest to British Embassy at 
Rome, 30th September 1954, Letter n° 1782/68/54, f. NR 1782/4. 
76 It would be of some interest to note that the Archdeacon’s proposal did not fit very 
conveniently with the Legation’s other arrangements, because it was waiting other British 
personalities from Europe. In particular, the Reverend Masters (who was Chaplain at Her Majesty’s 
Embassy in Vienna and had responsibilities of an ordained priest), was expected in Bucharest in those 
days, while another visit was scheduled for the week from the 13th to the 21st October next. For these 
activities see TNA, FO 371/111658, MacDermot to Archdeacon Bailey, 30th September 1954, Letter 
n° 1782/67/54, f. NR 1782/4. This fact brought the Legation to suggest that the Archdeacon’s journey 
was postponed a little, recommending at the same time that the better date would be from middle of 
January onward. It is not our interest to track in depth the events related to the Archdeacon’s trip. It 
may be sufficient to note that MacDermot received news from the Archdeacon in October. Bailey said 
that he would not be able to come until January, and that the decision on dates must await discussion 
with the Bishop, who the Archdeacon hoped to see in Malta at the start of November. This would give 
time for the implementation of the visa procedure, because it were needed three weeks before 
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Since a Treasury reply to his letter of 24th August did not arrived quickly, 
Hohler reiterated the request of an economic support from the Treasury on 22nd 
November77. The same day the Foreign Office received a note from Ministry of 
Works, written by Gilchrist. The Ministry did not accept fully that the building had 
to be considered a property of His Majesty’s Government like the one in which the 
Legation offices were housed. 
 
“We would remind you that this remark was made in 1950 purely as an 
argument for extending diplomatic immunity to the Church at a time when there 
was a possibility of seizure of the Church by the Roumanian State under a Decree 
of 4th August, 1948, for the Regulation of Religion in Roumania. This argument 
should not, in our opinion, be applied to the maintenance of the Church by us as 
part of the Legation property”78. 
 
At the same time, Gilchrist said that the Ministry accepted once again the 
political reasons moving the Legation – and then the Foreign Office itself – to ask a 
financial support for the Church’s exceptional repairs. And this opened the way for 
the solution of the problem.  
Hohler’s appeal of 24th August, 1954 did not received a prompt Treasury’s 
reply. It arrived on 2nd December, 1954 only. The delay, said the author, Drake, 
was due to long and passionate discussions into the Ministry, in a time when it 
                                                                                                                            
the traveller receives the visa to Romanian territory. For these questions the reader could look at 
TNA, FO 371/111658, Chancery of British Legation at Bucharest to British Embassy at Rome, 28th 
October 1954, Letter n° 1782/77/54, f. NR 1782/5. Archdeacon added that British Legation in Rome 
had offered to help him with his travel, and for which Bucharest was very grateful, since in that way it 
was possible that all the complex machinery for obtaining the vista could be partially simplified. In 
the middle of December all informations about Bailey’s visa were sent from Rome to the Foreign 
Office and promptly redirected to British Legation in Bucharest. The positive response of the British 
Embassy in Rome, giving all informations about Bailey’s visa, in TNA, FO 371/111658, Clarke to 
Foreign Office, 15th December 1954, Telegram n° 765, f. NR 1782/5. The timing suggested in the 
telegram induced MacDermot in asking London if Bailey did not want to travel with the Queen’s 
Messenger from Vienna on January 17th. Cf. TNA, FO 371/111658, MacDermot to Foreign Office, 
16th December 1954, Telegram n° 312, f. NR 1782/5. Bailey accepted MacDermot’s suggestion and 
decided to leave Bucharest on 27th January, 1955, taking advantage of Queen Messengers’ help also 
for leaving the country. Cf. TNA, FO 371/111658, Foreign Office to Chancery of British Legation at 
Bucharest, 13 January 1955, Telegram n° 10, f. NR 1782/8. 
77 Hohler feared that the delay could be caused by the fact that the Gibraltar Diocese was 
apprehensive of the possibility of being called to meet large bills at short notice and without any 
support from the Government. Cf. TNA, FO 371/111658, Hohler to Drake, 22nd November 1954, 
Letter w.r., f. NR 1782/2. 
78 TNA, FO 371/111658, Gilchrist to Skinner, 22nd November 1954, Letter n° I.F.99/610/01, f. 
NR 1782/7. Gilchrist noted that the title of the Church had been originally conveyed in 1900 to the 
then Minister in Bucharest by the Municipality of the city by Deed of Gift and it had been only 
because it was not desirable to leave the land vested in a single individual and because a committee of 
the British Community in Bucharest or their Trustees had no legal status to hold land that the title of 
property had been conveyed to British Government. In any case, it had been done on the 
understanding that Ministry of Works would have no financial responsibility.  
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seemed plain that detente between the two blocs – although it was considered a 
promising one – could not resolve all bilateral problems: an evidence that reinforced 
the case supporting the building refurbishment79. The Chancellor of Exchequers 
and his colleagues at the end had accepted the arguments of policy and prestige in a 
case which seemed unique. They were prepared to agree that 900 pounds could be 
paid by the Special Missions and Services Subhead of the Foreign Office Grants 
and Service Vote. At the same time, Drake must repeat the condition attached to the 
agreement reached to the payment in 1952, namely that, firstly, the payment was 
not regarded as an ongoing commitment for the running expenses of the Church; 
and, secondly, that details of the repairs had to be submitted to Ministry of Works 
for scrutiny80. Thus, Hohler on 11th December, 1954, could write to MacDermot 
announcing Treasury’s decision, the two conditions laid down by it and that the 
Treasury would not raise problems due to the fact that it was not allowed to control 
locally the condition of the building81. 
Expressing his satisfaction for the positive outcome, in January 1955 
MacDermot reiterated his belief that, after two years and half from the issue’s 
beginning, the need of preserving the building open seemed day after day 
strengthened by cogent political reasons. 
 
“It does not escape the notice of the population that in a country where the 
Church has been prostituted to the service of the régime we can and do keep our 
Church going and hold service in it once a month”82. 
 
Three days later, it was suggested that for the Foreign Office it would be a 
wise step to urge the Bishop of Gibraltar to respect his promise to finance the 
remaining part of repairs underpinning the political side of the issue.  
Practically, the affair ended at the start of 1955, when, after a tough pressure 
made by Brown83, and Hohler84, Canon Cocup wrote on behalf of Bishop of 
                                                 
79 Of course, Romania played its role in this diplomatic relaxation. A case study, relating with 
Italian-Romanian relations, is in Giuliano Caroli, La Romania nella politica estera italiana, 1919-
1965. Luci e ombre di un’amicizia storica, Nagard, Milano, 2009, pp. 398-428. 
80 This position in TNA, FO 371/111658, Drake to Hohler, 2nd December 1954, Letter n° 
IF.99/610/01, f. NR 1782/6. It was noted by a Foreign Office’s official that Ministry of Work could 
not evaluate the congruity of estimates expenditure unless it sent someone out on the spot, and it was 
not practicable. See TNA, FO 371/111658, Foreign Office Note, 8th December 1954, f. NR 1782/6. 
Anyway, this problem did not delayed the refurbishing activities. 
81 The letter went on reporting some Ministry of Work’s doubt on two proposed repairs. This 
informations and doubts in TNA, FO 371/111658, Hohler to MacDermot, 11th December 1954, 
Dispatch w.r., f. NR 1782/6. 
82 TNA, FO 371/116616, MacDermot to Hohler, 18th January 1955, Dispatch n° 1781/12/55, f. 
NR 1781/1. 
83 Cf. TNA, FO 371/116616, Brown’s Note, 21st January 1955, f. NR 1781/1. 
84 See FO 371/116616, Hohler to Bishop of Gibraltar, 4th February 1955, Letter w.r., f. NR 
1781/1. The same day, Hohler sent another letter to Drake, informing him of his recent 
correspondence with MacDermot and the Bishop of Gibraltar. Holher’s information to Drake in FO 
371/116616, Hohler to Drake, 4th February 1955, Letter w.r., f. NR 1781/1. And the same day also, a 
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Gibraltar and, without beating around the bush, asked in which ways the Foreign 
Office wanted the Archdiocese had to disburse the money85. After a letter from 
Brown86, on 2nd March, 1955, Hohler replied to Cocup suggesting the employ of 
the method adopted in 1952: the Legation would pay the costs of repairs and the 
Foreign Office would inform the Archdiocese of Gibraltar the way in which the 
money had been expended and the way to get the reimbursement87. 
From the above described notes, it is manifest that all matter was resolved on 
the ministerial and departmental level, and it possible to say that Foreign Office 
acted accurately when it identified BBC or Anglican Church as suitable tools of a 
positive foreign policy towards Eastern Communist régimes, or when it 
downgraded to second position every controversies on human rights. Although no 
one in Whitehall thought that this particular issue was irrelevant, it was – in those 
particular days – useless or, at least, ineffective. And this was because the West 
itself was not acting in many parts of the world fairly and many shortcoming could 
be ascribed to it88.  
                                                                                                                            
Brown’s letter was sent to Gilchrist acquainting her with the latest news on the works which the 
Church would need in order to make her completely refitted. Cf. FO 371/116616, Brown to Gilchrist, 
4th February 1955, Letter w.r., f. NR 1781/1. 
85 Cocup’s letter in TNA, FO 371/116616, Cocup to Hohler, 8th February 1955, Letter w.r., f. 
NR 1781/2. 
86 See TNA, FO 371/116616, Brown’s Note, 11th February 1955, f. NR 1781/2. On 18th 
February 1955, someone wrote a note in which the machinery set up in 1952 was described and the 
possible solution for the spending of the 900 pounds was proposed. Cf. TNA, FO 371/116616, 
Foreign Office’s Note, 18th February 1955, f. NR 1781/2. 
87 See TNA, FO 371/116616, Hohler to Cocup, 2nd March 1955, Dispatch w.r., f. NR 1781/2; 
cf. also TNA, FO 371/116616, Hohler to Bishop of Gibraltar, 3 March 1955, Letter w.r., f. NR 
1781/3. This note was the effect of a personal letter sent by the Bishop of Gibraltar to Hohler on 23rd 
of February in which Craske expressed his gratitude to the Foreign Office for his help for the repairs 
to the building. See TNA, FO 371/116616, Bishop of Gibraltar to Hohler, 23 February 1955, Letter 
w.r., f. NR 1781/3. 
88 The brightest example of how much the human rights’ issue could be used against Western 
powers arrived from the discussion over the admission of new members to United Nations which was 
held in New York during the second half of 1955. Until those days, any enlargement of the World 
organization had been ruled out by mutual and bilateral vetoes to Western or Soviet candidates. In 
1955, and in the wake of substantial improvement of political and diplomatic bilateral relations, that 
was named “Spirit of Genève”, fostered by the Austrian Peace Treaty ratification (for these aspects 
see Ennio Di Nolfo, Storia delle relazioni internazionali dal 1918 ai giorni nostri, Laterza, Roma-
Bari, 201117, pp. 807-865, in particular pp. 841-847) the Soviet had sought to break the deadlock by 
proposing a limited package deal, namely the mutual admission of certain Western and Soviet 
candidates. The proposal had been rejected by Western Powers as inconsistent with the United 
Nations Charter. However, the British Foreign Secretary, Harold Macmillan, noted that Nehru (the 
Indian leader) and Bulganin (who was in those days the Premier of Soviet Union) had agreed recently 
on a list of qualified States, worth of being supported in their bid for entry. Among those States there 
were Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary, Italy, Irish Republic, Japan, Portugal and Romania, indeed. 
Macmillan clarified pros and cons of such a line. Surely, Nehru’s proposal would break the stalemate 
(which was discrediting United Nations) and avoid the possibility that the Soviet Union could take 
inconvenient initiatives, potentially embarrassing for the Western powers. On the other hand, there 
were some negative aspects. Pressed by Moscow action, the Cabinet noted that, “We should have to 
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On the contrary, the emphasis put on religious matters could be considered a 
wise step because Eastern authorities reverted to them, and this was clear from the 
very start of Communist seizure of power. Immediately, Stalinist clique extended 
their control on Orthodox Churches in each Eastern countries, and tried to silence 
other denominations when they could. Frequently, they exploited Orthodox 
hierarchy for condemning unfair activities or violent deeds done by Western 
Powers or their allies89. Another proof of the fact that British Government in 
stressing the importance of religion in the ongoing war against Communism had hit 
                                                                                                                            
accept Bulgaria, Hungary and Roumania, despite their bad record in human rights matters, and 
Albania, despite the Corfu case”. See TNA, CAB 129/77/24, CP (55) 124, Admission of New 
Members to the United Nations: Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 14th 
September, 1955. Macmillan knew that the admission of new members would have adversely affected 
the voting position of the Colonial Powers and was sure that, if the proposed seventeen members 
would have been admitted, Great Britain would have forced to adopt a firmer line towards attempts 
by the United Nations to intervene in colonial questions within British jurisdiction. A large number of 
the candidates were likely to vote against Britain on colonial questions, and it had make difficult if 
not impossible for London to block objectionable action in General Assembly. This meant that 
London would be forced to make use more frequently of the veto power in future. Eventually, 
Macmillan thought that new members could not be excluded indefinitely, and some weeks after, he 
summarized his position saying that Moscow had proposed the admission en bloc of all the applicants 
except Japan, while the United States had unveiled their hostility toward the admittance of Hungary, 
Bulgaria and Romania. He added that Nehru’s proposal could not be deserted by the United 
Kingdom, because London had to demonstrate her sympathy towards newborn ex-colonial States. 
Accepting the proposal could have prevented a possible Russian claim that Great Britain and the 
United States were responsible of blocking the admission of new African and Asian States for racial 
reasons, and the Soviet use of this assertion for strengthening their influence in the Middle East and 
South East Asia. The solution which Macmillan envisaged was a British support to another Canadian 
proposal (which followed the Nehru’s one) with one change, namely that Spain could be added to the 
list, because including Madrid in it would increase the chance of securing American support. See 
TNA, CAB 129/78/8, CP (55) 158, United Nations, Admission of New Members: Memorandum by the 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 19th October, 1955. 
89 On 28th September, 1955 an article appeared in Informaţia Bucureştiului had described the 
Romanian Orthodox Church’s protest against the Turk Government and its undue violence against the 
Greeks citizens during riots bursted out recently in Istanbul. Although it was well-known that the 
Romanian Orthodox Church had been sold to the régime, this action seemed a proof of a change of pace 
by Bucharest. The Legation’s news in TNA, FO 371/116616, Chancery of British Legation at Bucharest 
to Foreign Office, 29th September 1955, Letter n° 1782/4/55“S”, f. NR 1781/4. In particular, the article 
(titled Statement of the Holy Synod of the Romanian Orthodox Church in Connection with the 
Disturbances in Constantinople) stated that the Romanian Church was entirely at the side of the 
Oecumenical Mother Church in Constantinople and of the faithful Greek people in the hardship they had 
experienced. Whitehall conceded that the support to the Greeks was in line with a course pursued with 
increasing frequency by the Romanian authorities. See TNA, FO 371/116616, Foreign Office Note, 12th 
October 1955, f. NR 1781/4. And it was similarly interesting – and from a certain point of view, 
worrisome – that Russian and Bulgarian Churches had issued similar statements. Cf. TNA, FO 
371/116616, Foreign Office Note, 14th October 1955, f. NR 1781/4. All these facts gave the impression 
of a possible change in political strategy towards Greece and her society by Soviets. Beyond the fact that 
a new, smooth action towards Athens should have been taken into account, with the final aim of 
convincing the Greeks that Communists remained hostile towards religion and worship, a quick solution 
which permitted the accession to the United Nations of new States (Romania included) could be the 
easiest way through which it was possible to control Eastern excesses. 
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a sensitive point, arrived in 1955 when Romanian Orthodox authorities had tried to 
gain sympathy in Greek public opinion and in every Eastern Orthodox Churches 
thanks to a celebration for the Seventieth anniversary of the proclamation of the 
autocephalous Romanian Orthodox Church90. The event had been well reported in 
the press, a proof that the régime whished to draw a positive picture of religious 
freedom and toleration in the country, thanks to the fact that the gathering was 
characterized by some unflattering speeches pronounced by some Orthodox 
Metropolites, who spoke harshly against Western bloc91. It was a matter of fact that 
there had not been such gathering of Orthodox ecclesiastic from both sides of the 
Curtain since an Orthodox Conference which was held in Moscow in July 1948, 
and British specialist on this matters, Miller, on 29th December, 1955, noted that 
these changes were an important progress in Romanian religious policies. He 
suggested that Soviet authorities were behind this event, because they believed the 
Romanian Church could be entrusted of a role which the Russian one could not 
fulfil by itself without raising a general suspicion92.  
                                                 
90 The British Legation wrote to Northern Department in London, on 27th October, 1955, about 
a recent considerable gathering of dignitaries of Orthodox Churches in Bucharest. They had convened 
in the city for the celebration of the Seventieth anniversary of the proclamation of the Romanian 
Orthodox Church as an autocephalous Church. As it was already emphasized in past reports, the 
leaders of the local Orthodox Church were docile followers of the régime and obedient supporters of 
the Peace Campaign organized by the Soviet authorities in the past years. This scheme had obtained 
decisive support not only in the Eastern countries and in their public opinion, but also in sectors of 
Western societies. From British point of view, particularly disquieting was the Metropolitan 
Hrisostom of Filippi’s speech. He was the representative of the Greek Orthodox Church and both his 
words and his participation were deemed a step towards an unleashed cooperation between the two 
sides of the Iron Curtain which could produce more damaging consequences rather than positive 
results. Hrisostom said that, “When we go back to our country we shall be the heralds of the close 
collaboration which exists in Roumania between the Government and the Church. I cannot forget, the 
speaker said in conclusion, that the first movement of liberation of the Greek people started from this 
country”. Reception in Honour of the Delegation of Foreign Orthodox Churches, in “Romînia 
Liberă”, 25 October 1955, in TNA, FO 371/116616, Chancery of British Legation at Bucharest to 
Northern Department, Foreign Office, 27 October 1955, Dispatch n° 1782/5/55 “S”, f. NR 1781/5. 
By the way, the delegation of the Greek Orthodox Churches stop-over in Sofia on the way to 
Romania was described in TNA, FO 371/116616, Chancery of British Legation at Sofia to Northern 
Department, Foreign Office, 28 October 1955, Dispatch n° 1782/9 “S”, f. NR 1781/6. 
91 See TNA, FO 371/116616, Chancery of British Legation at Bucharest to Northern 
Department, Foreign Office, 27 October 1955, Dispatch n° 1782/5/55 “S”, f. NR 1781/5. The 
dispatch enclosed a summary of the most important speeches pronounced by the head of delegations 
gathered in Bucharest. All of them praised with satisfaction that the Church and the State in Romania 
were in good relations and considered this an excellent example of the well grounded relationship 
between authorities and peoples in States where a society had to struggle for the consolidation of new 
social order, for peace and international collaboration.  
92 Thanks to this it is better understandable the Oecumenical Patriarcate’s willingness to meet 
Patriarch Kirill of Bulgaria, whose elevation had not been recognized by other Churches. The British 
expert considered that the message sent out by the Russian and satellite Churches to the Patriarch of 
Constantinople at the end of September appeared a well timed and able step. It had helped to bring 
together the various Orthodox Churches and could be considered a point in favour of the Communist 
authorities.. Miller’s opinion in TNA, FO 371/116616, Miller Note, 29 December 1955, f. NR 1781/5. 
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In the light of what has been said, it is possible to affirm that the survival of 
the building housing the Anglican Church in Bucharest appeared a prudent step 
since it confirmed to the Romanian people the existence of a different faith and 
different values than those favoured by the Communist régime and by the 
Orthodox Church controlled by it. The determination in defending an isolate 
stronghold was a purely political act done by London. From the events it can be 
drawn interesting reflections for the assessment of British policy towards Central 
and Eastern Europe countries during the first years of Communist rule. These 
considerations help the scholar to better define the political boundaries within 
which London wished to develop its action. If London propensity for cautious and 
steady propaganda activities beyond the curtain was known (with its corollary that 
ruled out any support for popular revolutions that could not be sustained by the 
West93), less known in my opinion is the British attention to the use of religious 
structures to combat the silent war to win the hearts and minds of public opinion in 
Eastern and Central Europe. If the use of Catholic Church was excluded, as we 
have seen, in consequence of the Vatican complete autonomy (a condition which 
transformed the Holy See in an inconvenient fellow-traveller), direct approach to 
Romanian society (and, generally speaking, to the Eastern societies) were 
evaluated and sometime realized94. The Anglican Church in Bucharest – although a 
small one – was regarded as an invaluable stronghold that had to be defended at 
any cost, in a period when the Soviet societies (and the Romanian one was not a 
exception) were assuming a ferocious inward-looking attitude. Adopting their usual 
realist point of view, the British Government and Foreign Office, after Bucharest 
had cut the long established economic ties and relations between Great Britain and 
Romania, decided to preserve a small post in the Balkan state, from where, it was 
believed, it would have been feasible to give proof of the Western values, firstly, 
and from where, secondly, it would have been possible to interlace new cultural or 
economic relations for the future95. The economic and industrial ties between 
London and Bucharest that were weaved during the 1960s are already known and 
they do not need to be explained. Surely, the roots of these relations could be 
tracked down in the facts analysed here. 
                                                 
93 Between many interesting examples of British attention towards propaganda warfare, both 
in Europe and outside, and of the national effectiveness in comparison with the quality and efficacy of 
Communist propaganda (the Romanian one included) see TNA, CAB 129/97/28, C. (59) 78, Book 
Exports: Memorandum by the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, 1st May, 1959, Annex B: 
Russian and Chinese Export of Cheap Books. 
94 The strategic need which was beyond this tactic in TNA, CAB 129/105/47, C. (61) 97, East-
West Relations: Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 19th July, 1961. 
95 The “we mean business” approach of British diplomacy is well showed in TNA, CAB 
128/35/74, CC (61), 74th Conclusion, Commercial Policy: Trade with Roumania, Minute n° 5, 14th 
December 1961; and TNA, CAB 129/107/64, C. (61) 214, East-West Relations: Memorandum by the 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 12th December, 1961. 
